Olaf Theodore Stevensen And Barbara Ann Stevensen v. Bailey Bird And Virginia Bird : Brief of Plaintiffs-Cross-Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
Olaf Theodore Stevensen And Barbara Ann
Stevensen v. Bailey Bird And Virginia Bird : Brief of
Plaintiffs-Cross-Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Watkins & Faber; Attorneys for Plaintiffs-cross-RespondentsE.
Craig Smay; Attorney for Defendants-Cross-Appellants
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Stevensen v. Bird, No. 16416 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1723
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OLAF THEODORE STEVENSEN 
and BARBARA ANN STEVENSEN, 
Plaintiffs and 
Cross-Respondents, 
vs. 
BAILEY BIRD and 
VIRGINIA BIRD, 
Defendants and 
Cross-Appellants. 
~ ;/Jc,·. I &::3 '17v-
case No. 16416 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-CROSS-RESPONDENTS 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD 
DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE G. HAL TAYLOR, JUDGE 
E. CRAIG SMAY 
Berman & Giauque 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Defendants-
Cross-Appellants 
NALTER P. FABER, JR. 
MICHAEL A. NEIDER 
BARRE G. BURGON 
Watkins & Faber 
606 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Cross-Respondents 
JMJ. 0 1S?O 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OLAF THEODORE STEVENSEN 
and BARBARA ANN STEVENSEN, 
Plaintiffs and 
Cross-Respondents, 
vs. 
BAILEY BIRD and 
VIRGINIA BIRD, 
Defendants and 
Cross-Appellants. 
Case No. 16416 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-CROSS-RESPONDENTS 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD 
DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE G. HAL TAYLOR, JUDGE 
E. CRAIG SMAY 
Berman & Giauaue 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Defendants-
Cross-Appellants 
l'lALTER p • FABER I JR. 
MICHAEL A. NEIDER 
BARRE G. BURGON 
Watkins & Faber 
606 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Cross-Respondents 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION 
INTERPRETING THE LEASE TO 
GIVE STEVENSEN THE POWER 
TO ARRANGE PARKING, ERECT 
FENCES AND RELOCATE THE 
ACCESSWAY IS THE CORRECT 
DECISION BECAUSE THE LEASE 
PAGE 
1 
1 
2 
2 
5 
IS CONTROLLING 5 
POINT II. CROSS-APPELLANTS AND THEIR 
TENANTS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT 
IN STEVENSENS' SEPARATE 
PROPERTY BECAUSE THE LEASE 
GRANTS NO SUCH RIGHT 6 
POINT III. THE COURSE OF DEALING 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS 
NOT AN ISSUE TRIED BELOW AND 
CANNOT BE RAISED ON APPEAL 
BY CROSS-APPELLANTS 8 
POINT IV. THE LEASE BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES AS IT CONCERNS THE 
LOCATION OF THE PARKING 
ARRANGEMENT AND THE LOCATION 
OF THE ACCESSWAY THERETO HAS 
NOT BEEN MODIFIED AND WAS NOT 
SO HELD BY THE COURT BELOW 9 
POINT V. THE DECISION OF THE THIRD DIS-
TRIST COURT IN KATSANEVAS v. 
STEVENSEN, CIVIL NO. 226232 IS 
NOT RES JUDICATA OF THE ISSUES 
TRIED BELOW NOR DOES SUCH DEC-
ISION HAVE THE FAR REACHING 
EFFECT ARGUED BY THE CROSS-
APPELLANTS 11 
20NCLUSION 13 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Table of Contents (cont.) -ii-
Cases Cited 
Bamberger Productions v. Certified Productions, 
48 P.2d 489 (Utah 1935) 
Denver Plastics, Inc. v. Snyder, 416 P.2d 370 
(Colo. 1966) 
Dillard v. McKnight, 209 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1949) 
Popplewell v. Jones, 211 P.2d 283 (Okl. 1949) 
Powerine Co. v. Russell's, Inc., 135 P.2d 906 
(1943) 
Radley v. Smith, 313 P.2d 465 (Utah 1957) 
Richards v. Hodson, 485 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1971) 
Authorities Cited 
51 CJS, Landlord-Tenants § 232(2) 
11 
8 
11 
10 
5 
8 
11 
6 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OLAF THEODORE STEVENSEN 
and BARBARA ANN STEVENSEN, 
Plaintiffs and 
Cross-Respondents, 
vs. 
BAILEY BIRD and VIRGINIA 
BIRD, 
Defendants and 
Cross-Appellants. 
Case No. 16416 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-CROSS-RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is a cross appeal by Cross-Appellants (Bird) from 
that part of the declaratory judgment below interpreting provisions 
of a written lease executed in 1961 between the parties and holding 
Bird has no rights whatsoever in certain of lessees' (Stevensen) 
property located near leasehold property subject to such lease. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to the court which found Stevensen had 
the power under the lease to arrange the parking on the leasehold 
property so long as he complied with the other provisions of the 
lease ana round that Stevensen could relocate the accessway to 
such parking to any convenient location including its original loca-
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-2-
tion on Goddard Court. The court below also found that the lease 
did not grant any right whatsoever to Bird in Stevensen's property 
and held that Stevensen could remove the accessway and the parking 
stalls reserved and used by Bird from separate property owned by 
Stevensen to their original locations on the leasehold property. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Cross .. Respondents (Stevensen) seek affirmance of that por-
tion of the Declaratory Judgment below, its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, pertaining to the parking area 
I 
of the leasehold I 
property, Stevensen's separate property and to the provisions of 
the lease concerned with the parking arrangement thereon. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Cross-Respondents dispute the statement of facts contain~ 
in Cross-Appellants' brief and therefore submits the following 
statement of facts: 
1. In 1961 Cross-Appellants (Bird) and Cross-Respondents 
(Stevensen) entered into a lease of the upper two floors of the 
premises located at 251 and 253 East 200 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, the parking area to the rear of the building at said address 
(to the north of the lessors' buildings) and the alley way l0.84 
feet wide to the east of such buildings (the alley way is also knowr. 
as Goddard Court). (Plaintiff Exhibit "P-1"). See plat attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A". 
2. The lease between Stevensen and Bird is Exhibit "P-1" 
and provides in pertinent part as follows: 
I 
I 
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(a) Paragraph 5 of the lease on page 4 grants Stevensen 
the right to grade and blacktop the parking area and to mark 
and designate the same for the parking of motor vehicles. 
Paragraph 5 also reserves the first 26 parking stalls which 
can be entered on the leasehold property by Bird and his 
tenants. 
(b) Paragraph 7 provides as follows: 
Lessee shall have the right during the 
term of this lease or any extension thereof, 
to relocate the accessway to the rear of 
Lessors' buildings from its present location, 
Goddard Court, to any other convenient loca-
tion, provided only that Lessee shall at all 
times make available a suitable and adequate 
access to the rear of Lessors' buildings and 
shall keep a lane of traffic available for 
smooth and efficient inflow and outflow of 
traffic to the ramp at the rear of Lessors' 
buildings . . • Lessee shall so arrange the 
parking area as to not unnecessarily interfere 
with the efficient and proper use of the loading 
facilities as now established at the rear of 
Lessors' buildings. 
(c) Paragraph 10 of the lease provides as follows: 
Lessors convenant that Lessees shall have 
the quiet enjoyment of the premises demised 
herein and shall have the right to, at Lessees' 
own expense, construct fences or other suitable 
boundary markers to limit the parking area •.. 
3. Stevensen had previously acquired Lorenzo Smith & Sons 
property just east of Goddard Court to facilitate expansion of his 
athletic club facilities which included a right of way over Goddard 
Court (Plaintiffs' Exhibit "P-1", R.243) See plat attached as 
Exhibit "A". (This property was referred to below as the Smith property). 
4. Prior to the lease and for the first few years thereafter, 
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Bird and his tenants parked behind his buildings on the leasehold 
property. (Defendants' Exhibits 12, 13, and 14; R.240) 
5. Over a period of three years after execution of the 
lease, Stevensen constructed a swimming pool facility on the north 
portions of the Smith property and the leasehold property, he razed 
Lorenzo Smith & Sons buildings, and he graded and blacktopped 
the leasehold property and the remaining portion of the Smith 
propertyforparking and access. (R.243-44) After improvements, 
Stevensen moved some of Bird's parking from the rear of his build-
ings onto the Smith property to meet needs existing at that time. 
(R. 240, 251) 
6. Thereafter, Stevens en used portions of the Smith prop-
erty and a small portion of the Bird leasehold property for athletic 
club facilities and has used the remaining portion of the Smith 
property and most of the Bird leasehold property for various 
parking arrangements as needed or required by various circumstances 
existing in the area from time to time. (R. 303, 308, 309, and 311 
7. As the downtown business area grew and construction of 
improvements on real property limited the availability of parking 
in the immediate area, disputes over parking and particular locatioi 
between Stevensen, Bird, Bird's tenants, and their patrons grew to 
the point where such disputes were a regular occurrence jeopardizin, 
persons and property in the area. 
58, 92, 94, and 95) 
(Bird, et al v. Stevensen, T.51, 
8. Stevensen, as lessee of the leasehold property, att~~ 
to resolve the parking problems as they developed to facilitate 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-5-
management of the parking, but was prevented from doing so by the 
lack of cooperation of Bird, his other tenants, and their patrons. 
(Bird, et al. v. Stevensen, T.57, 58, 92, 94, and 95) 
9. Stevensen determined that the solution to the parking 
difficulties was to separate access to the parking from the street 
entrance at Second South so patrons entering either the leasehold 
or Stevensen's property would know at the point of entrance where 
they were permitted to park. Such separation would necessitate 
relocating Bird's parking stalls and accessway from Stevensen's 
separate property arranging them on the leasehold property, but would 
not diminish the number of parking stalls or the accessway. (Bird, 
et al. v. Steve41sen, T.95) 
10. As Stevensen began to exercise his powers under the 
lease and attempted to alter the parking arrangement, confrontation 
continued between himself and Bird resulting in the present action 
for declaratory relief to interpret the lease and declare the 
rights of the parties in such lease so that Stevensen could 
rearrange the parking and alleviate the parking problems. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION 
INTERPRETING THE LEASE TO GIVE 
STEVENSEN THE POWER TO ARRANGE PARKING, 
ERECT FENCES AND RELOCATE THE ACCESS-
WAY IS THE CORRECT DECISION 
BECAUSE THE LEASE IS CONTROLLING. 
It is commonly accepted that a lease must be construed with 
reference to the intentions of the parties. Powerine Co. v. Russell's 
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Inc., 135 P.2d 906 (1943). In finding the intent of the parties 
the terms of the lease, however expressed, if unambiguous, are to 
control the construction and operation of the lease. 51 CJS, 
Landlord-Tenants§ 232(2). Consequently, the clear and unambigoo~ 
language of the lease is controlling and the lower court's construe-
tion of the agreement in this case is proper. 
In clear and unambiguous language the 1961 lease grants 
Stevensen the right to rearrange the parking configuration on lease-
hold property and to erect fences to facilitate management of the 
parking area. Paragraph 5 of the lease permits Stevensen to 
blacktop the leasehold and mark it for parking so long as an ade-
quate access is maintained and 26 parking stalls are reserved for 
the Lessor. Paragraph 7 grants Stevensen the right to relocate 
the accessway to any convenient location, and paragraph 10 gives 
Stevensen the "right to erect fences and other suitable boundary 
markers to limit the parking area." 
The lower court's judgment is consistent with the express 
terms of the agreement. By confirming Stevensens' right to erect 
fences on the leasehold property and by confirming Stevens ens' righ 
to rearrange the parking and accessways to the original configura-
tions the court has reached the proper decision required by the 
lease. 
POINT II 
CROSS-APPELLANTS AND THEIR TENANTS DO 
NOT HAVE A RIGHT IN STEVENSENS' SEPARATE 
PROPERTY BECAUSE THE LEASE GRANTS NO SUCH RIGHT. 
Prior to execution of the Stevensen-Bird lease in 1961, 
--
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and at all times subsequent thereto, Stevensen has owned property 
adjoining Goddard Court on the east (Goddard Court being 10.84 
foot right of way running north and south directly east of Birds' 
building), and a 1/2 interest in the 10.84 foot right of way 
over Goddard Court. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit "P-1", R.243) By the 
1961 lease, Stevensen acquired from Bird the other 1/2 interest in 
the right of way over Goddard Court. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit "P-1") 
Nowhere in the 1961 lease or anywhere else has Stevensen 
granted to Bird a right in his property. Nevertheless, Cross-
Appellants argue that Stevensen is prevented from relocating the 
parking and accessway thus requiring Stevensen to utilize his own 
property for Cross-Appellants' parking and Cross-Appellants' access 
to their parking. Such argument is contrary to reason and law. 
The court below specifically held in paragraph 6(a) of 
the Conclusions of Law as follows; "The lease does not grant 
defendants any right or interest in the Smith property". (R.189) 
The lower court's judgment granting Stevensen the power to arrange the 
parking, relocate the accessway, and erect a fence to separate the 
parking also recognizes that Cross-Appellants have no right in the 
Stevensen property referrea to as the Smith ?roperty. The pertinent 
portion of the Judgment is as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs are entitled to and are hereby granted a 
declaratory judgment declaring the meaning of the lease 
between plaintiffs and defendants to grant plaintiffs the 
right to rearrange the parking configuration and also to 
move all parking from the Smith property to the rear of 
Lessors' buildings so long as plaintiffs comply with the 
other provisions of the lease between the parties. 
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2. The lease between the parties authorizes plaintiffs 
to relocate the accessway extending from Second South to 
the rear of defendants' buildingsto any convenient location 
including its original location within the confines of 
Goddard Court so long as the plaintiffs comply with the 
other provisions of the lease between the parties. 
3. The lease between the parties authorizes 
plaintiffsto erect fences which limit and define the park-
ing areas and access thereto so long as plaintiffs comply 
with the other provisions of the lease between the 
parties. (R.183-84) 
POINT III 
THE COURSE OF DEALING BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
WAS NOT AN ISSUE TRIED BELOW AND CANNOT BE 
RAISED ON APPEAL BY CROSS-APPELLANTS. 
Cross-Appellants did not plead, submit evidence on, or 
argue the issue of the course of dealing between the parties in the 
trial below and such issue cannot be raised now on appeal. Radley 
v. Smith, 313 P.2d 465 (Utah 1957). The issues below involve 
the interpretation of the lease and not the course of dealing 
between the parties. 
In addition, Cross-Appellants seek to create an ambiguity 
in the written terms of the lease where none exists. If there is no I 
ambiguity, the lease itself controls. Denver Plastics, Inc. v. 
Snyder, 416 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1966) . 
I 
There is no arnbigui ty in the provisions of the lease which 
leaves any doubt that Stevensen has the power to erect fences to 
limit the parking especially where such fences are on his own 
property. (See pazagraph 10 of plaintiffs' Exhibit "P-1") 
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Certainly any convenient location includes its original location 
on Goddard Court. 
There is no ambiguity in the lease which can be construed 
to create a right or interest in Cross-Appellants to the separate 
property of Stevensen. (See plaintiffs' Exhibit "P-1") Stevensen 
has not given Bird a right in his property and no course of deal-
ing between them can create such a right. 
There is certainly no ambiguity in the lease as to Steven-
sens' power and right to arrange the parking on the leasehold 
property a fortiori when such arrangement is to remove the parking 
from his property. 
Cross-Appellants seek to create an issue of law on appeal 
which was not tried below based on ambiguities that do not exist. 
Such is clearly improper and a telling point is that Cross-Appellants' 
arguments are based on no argument, fact, or pleading cited to 
this court in the record below. 
In addition, if the course of dealing between the parties 
shows anything, it is that the parking arrangement has been changed 
several times and that Stevensen has the authority to change the 
parking as the conditions require. (R.303, 308, 309, and 312) 
POINT IV 
THE LEASE BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS IT CONCERNS THE 
LOCATION OF THE PARKING ARRANGEMENT AND THE 
LOCATION OF THE ACCESSWAY THERETO HAS NOT BEEN 
MODIFIED AND WAS NOT SO HELD BY THE COURT BELOW. 
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The court's Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment below 
do not hold that defendants' Exhibit "D-4", the 1975 description of 
parking stalls, was a modification of the lease nor would such hol~ 
ing be correct. In effect, the court below ruled that Stevensen 
has the power, independent of the lease, to remove parking re-
served by the lease between the parties from his separate property 
to the leasehold property. 
Defendants' Exhibit "D-4" cannot be a modification of the 
lease as to the arrangement of parking stalls and the location of 
access because by its own terms, it is simply an agreement on the 
assignment of stalls to Cross-Appellants' tenants as of a particu-
lar date. The language on the bottom portion of Exhibit "D-4" is 
as follows: 
This rough sketch is made again at the 
instance of Ted Stevensen, Midtown Auto Parts, 
and Church of Scientology to show stalls assigned 
to various tenants. Each tenant will be given 
a copy of the sketch. 
Thus, the Exhibit by its own terms was to clear up confusion as 
to which parking stalls were assigned to the various tenants as of 
a particular date. It was not to modify the lease as to Stevensens' / 
right to relocate the access and parking stalls entirely from his I 
separate property. 
Such a modification would also require explicit unambi-
guous language which Exhibit "D- 4" does not con a tin. Popplewel~ 
Jones, 211 P. 2d 283 (OKLA. 19 49). In addition, Cross-Appellants ha:I 
not shown mutual assent or consideration for the modification. I 
I 
i 
J 
I 
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Bamberger Prodictions v. Certified Productions, 48 P.2d 489 
(Utah 1935) . 
POINT V 
THE DECISION OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN KATSANEVAS V. STEVENSEN, CIVIL NO. 226232 
IS NOT RES JUDICATA OF THE ISSUES TRIED BELOW 
NOR DOES SUCH DECISION HAVE THE FAR REACHING EFFECT 
ARGUED BY THE CROSS-APPELLANTS. 
Cross-Appellants have misapplied the principle of res 
judicata when they argue that the decision in Katsanevas v. Stevensen, 
Third District Court, Civil No. 226232, bars the decision of the 
lower court in the present appeal. The principle of res judicata is 
only available when a judgment on the merits of a court of competant 
jurisdiction determines identical rights, facts, or issues between 
the same parties or their privies. Richards v. Hodson, 485 P.2d 1044 
(Utah 1971); Dillard v. McKnight, 209 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1949). 
The Katsanevas case was between Cross-Respondent Stevensen 
and Steve and Mike Katsenavas, two of Cross-Appellants' lessees. 
I Cross-Appellants were not parties to that case and have not obtained 
s' l 
\ 
nor have they been conveyed any right in such case. The issue of the 
~atsanevas case was whether Stevensen had the right to certain of 
the 26 reserved parking stalls when such were "untenanted" as defined 
by the lease. The provisions of the lease between Stevensen and Bird 
covering Stevensens' powers to arrange parking and relocate the 
h'' 
accessway were not at issue nor was the location or particular 
I 
arrangement of any particular parking stalls an issue. The issue 
I 
I 
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of Stevensens' right to erect fences was also not an issue. 
Thus, the parties being different had the issues being 
different, the principles of res judicata do not apply to bar the 
lower court decision. 
Cross-Appellants own argument best illustrates the weakness 
of their position when he argues on page 11 of his brief that, 
Lessee remains under a permanent injunction from 
the Court from rearraging the parking on the 
leased premises unless Lessee can demonstrate to 
the court an extreme good cause for doing so. 
(Emphasis added) . 
Even if Judge Sawaya's order in Katsanevas v. Stevensen affected 
the arrangement of the parking on the leasehold premises in some 
way, such order does not prevent Stevensen from removing the 26 I 
reserved parking stalls and the accessway from his own separate . I 
property. To state that the Katsanevas order and the lease requires 
- I 
Stevensen to provide Bird and his tenants with parking on Stevensens'' 
own property is unfounded in fact, unfounded in the law, and un-
founded in reason. 
On several occasions in the trial below, counsel for Cros~ I 
Appellants argued that Katsanevas v. Stevensen prevented Stevensen I 
from rearranging the parking. (R.171, 205, 206, 221, 377, and 378
1 referring to opposition to Steven sens' motion for Summary Judgment! 
Certainly if Judge Taylor were required to find extreme g~od cause, r 
he did so by implication in his Findgins of Fact, Conclusions of 
1 Law and Judgment. 
J 
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CONCLUSION 
That portion of the lower court decision relating to 
Stevensens' powers to arrange the parking, relocate the accessway 
and erect fences should be affirmed because such powers are 
clearly found in the lease and because in any event Stevensens 
can remove such stalls and accessway from their separate property 
and erect a fence on the property line. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of January, 1980. 
WATKINS & FABER 
~~/~JI{;(,~~ l'w~ER P. FABER, JR. 
MICHAEL A. NEIDER 
BARRE G. BURGON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Cross-Respondents 
606 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 363-4491 
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